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No. 20061177-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES, an agency of the State of Utah, 
and UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
Respondents. 
Brief of Department of Workforce Services 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Career Service Review Board's (CSRB's) Decision and Final Agency 
Action was entered on December 6, 2006. R. 659-71. Lorin Blauer filed a 
petition for judicial review on December 29, 2006. This Court has jurisdiction 
over that petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004), 
which confers jurisdiction on this Court over appeals from "the final orders 
and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies." 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (West 2004). 
Blauer filed a motion with this Court on April 9, 2007, seeking to have 
this appeal transferred to the district court. Without reserving the issue for 
plenary consideration, this Court denied that motion on May 7, 2007. See 
Addendum B. 
Issues Presented 
1. Formal CSRB adjudication 
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from CSRB's 
formal decisions. Pursuant to clear administrative rule, CSRB's decision here 
was designated as a formal proceeding. This Court has already denied 
Blauer's previous motion to transfer this appeal to the district court for a trial 
de novo. Likewise, in a separate district court proceeding, to which Blauer 
was a party and from which he did not appeal, the district court concluded 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because CSRB's decision was a 
formal adjudication. Given all this, and that no factual disputes need to be 
resolved for this Court to review CSRB's jurisdictional decision, should this 
Court deny Blauer's renewed request to transfer this case to the district court 
for a trial de novo? 
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A. Standard of Review 
"[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine 
whether the requested action is within its jurisdiction." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). When a matter is outside 
the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
This issue is unique to this appeal. 
2. CSRB's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
The legislature granted CSRB limited authority to hear certain 
employment grievances that have been raised before the employing agency 
and then timely appealed to CSRB. After Blauer lost his demotion grievance 
before CSRB, he filed a request for reconsideration, raising six new issues 
that had not been timely appealed through the statutory grievance process. 
Did CSRB correctly determine that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits of 
those new issues? 
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A. Standard of Review 
Since this issue raises a question of general law, this Court reviews the 
"CSRB's conclusion for correctness, granting no deference to that agency's 
decision." Holland v. CSRB, 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
This issue was raised by the Department in its motion to dismiss. 
R. 465-632. The issue was considered by CSRB in its December 6, 2006 
Decision and Final Agency Action. R. 659-71. 
Determinative Constitutional 
Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
The following provisions are attached in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l) (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(2) (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-402 (West 2004) 
Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-17 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a petition for judicial review of final agency action of the CSRB. 
CSRB concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over new issues in Blauer's 
employment grievance that were raised for the first time in a request for 
reconsideration. 
2. Course of the Proceedings Below 
Blauer, an attorney for the Department of Workforce Services 
(Department), filed a grievance in July 2003 over an unsuccessful 
performance evaluation. R. 528-33. He also complained of the Department's 
failure to define job performance standards and that he did not have a 
current performance plan in place. R. 532; 642-43. That grievance was 
appealed to the Department's director, who ruled in Blauer's favor and 
changed the performance evaluation to "successful." R. 548-49. Blauer did not 
appeal that grievance to the CSRB. R. 636. 
In September 2003, the Department of Workforce Services 
reapportioned Blauer's job duties and assigned him to conduct administrative 
hearings full time. R. 551-53. Blauer grieved his new assignment to the 
Career Service Review Board (CSRB), claiming the assignment was a 
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demotion. R. 554-55, The Department denied his grievance, concluding that 
no demotion had occurred. R. 559-61. After conducting an administrative 
review of the file, CSRB concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
grievance because no demotion had occurred. R. 20-26. 
Blauer then filed a request for reconsideration, asking CSRB to review 
six new issues not previously raised in the CSRB proceeding. R. 27-149. Five 
of those claims alleged that the Department violated personnel rules.1 
R. 57-62. The other claim requested that CSRB review some purported 
written reprimands in Blauer's file. R. 62. Specifically, Blauer alleged that: 
a. the Department failed to define Blauer's job performance parameters 
(R. 57-58); 
b. the Department assigned job tasks to Blauer outside his job 
description (R. 29-30); 
c. Department representatives harassed and retaliated against Blauer 
for his request for accommodation for disabilities (R. 59-60); 
blauer 's request for reconsideration also included claims of 
constructive suspension and constructive termination, R. 61-62, but Blauer 
makes no mention of those claims in his opening brief and has therefore 
waived appellate review of that issue. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 23, 
16 P. 3d 540 (stating that failure to raise issue in opening brief generally 
constitutes waiver). Moreover, the district court did not list those claims in its 
order of remand, R. 583, and Blauer did not discuss the claims in his response 
to the Department's motion to dismiss. R. 633-46. 
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d. the Department failed to properly maintain Blauer's personnel 
records and refused him access to documentation in his personnel file 
(R. 60-61); 
e. the Department improperly denied Blauer administrative leave 
(R. 61); and 
f. the Department placed negative letters in Blauer's personnel file, 
thereby effectively issuing written reprimands against him. R. 62. 
CSRB denied the motion for reconsideration, declining to consider the 
new claims because it deemed those claims to be ancillary to the demotion 
grievance. R. 276-82. 
Blauer filed a petition for review in the district court, and the district 
court ultimately agreed with CSRB that no demotion occurred.2 R. 582-83. 
The court, however, remanded the new claims of alleged violations of 
personnel rules to CSRB for consideration. R. 583. The remand order did not 
2And this Court, in turn, agreed with the district court, holding that, 
because Blauer's assignment to conduct hearings full time was not a 
demotion, "CSRB did not err in declining jurisdiction over Blauer's 
grievance." Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 488, f 36, 128 
P.3d 1204. While that appeal was pending, Blauer's employment was 
terminated On November 3, 2004, based on his inability to return to work 
after taking one year of medical leave. That termination is the subject 
another appeal pending before this Court, Blauer v. Department of Workforce 
Services, Utah Court of Appeals, No. 20060702. That appeal has been briefed 
and submitted for decision. 
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specify whether a formal or informal adjudication was required and did not 
direct CSRB to determine that it had jurisdiction: 
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief is dismissed 
with prejudice, with the exception that the allegations in 
Paragraph 34 subsections (c) through (j) of the complaint which 
. . . are not based upon unlawful demotion, and which were also 
set forth by the Plaintiff in his Motion for Reconsideration 
(previously filed with the CSRB), are remanded to the CSRB for 
consideration. 
R. 583 (emphasis added). 
On remand to CSRB, the Department moved to dismiss the remanded 
issues for lack of jurisdiction. R. 465-632. CSRB conducted a jurisdictional 
hearing, where the parties presented memoranda and oral argument to a 
hearing officer. R. 652-58; 659. The Department attached documentary 
evidence to its memorandum. R. 483-632. Blauer referred to that evidence in 
his response but did not submit documentary evidence of his own, although 
nothing in the record indicates he was precluded from doing so. R. 645. CSRB 
concluded, in a decision issued December 6, 2006, that it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the six remanded issues. R. 659-71. 
To overturn CSRB's December 6, 2006 decision, Blauer then 
commenced two separate legal actions. First, on December 29, 2006, Blauer 
filed a petition for review with this Court, initiating the present action. Then, 
on January 3, 2007, Blauer filed a new district court action seeking judicial 
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review, in the form of a trial de novo, of the CSRB's decision. The complaint 
also contained a second claim for a declaratory judgment against CSRB and 
the Department. See Docket, Blauer v. Utah Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third 
Judicial District Court, Case No. 070900108.3 
On April 9, 2007, the district court dismissed the new district court 
action in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction. The district court's order stated 
that: a "CSRB jurisdictional hearing is a formal adjudication"; "Utah district 
courts are not granted jurisdiction over such appeals"; and the district court 
did "not have jurisdiction to review the CSRB decision [of December 6, 2006]." 
See Addendum A (Order of April 9, 2007, Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 
Third Judicial District Court, No. 070900108). 
Blauer then filed a motion with this Court, seeking to have this appeal 
transferred to the district court for a trial de novo, arguing that the CSRB 
decision was an informal adjudication. This Court denied the motion outright 
on May 7, 2007. See Addendum B. 
3This new 2007 action should not be confused with another district 
court action Blauer brought against the Department, Blauer v. Department of 
Workforce Services, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 040927275, that 
was consolidated with the first district court petition for judicial review, 
Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, Third Judicial District Court, 
Case No. 040900221. 
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3. Disposition Below 
By its decision dated December 6, 2006, CSRB concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the remanded claims. R. 659-71. 
Statement of Facts 
In his opening brief, Blauer includes a lengthy statement of facts 
relating the underlying allegations supporting the six new claims he raised in 
his request for CSRB reconsideration. But those facts are unnecessary to this 
Court's resolution of this appeal. CSRB did not address the merits of the new 
claims because it concluded that the undisputed procedural history of the 
case showed that Blauer had not properly preserved the claims for CSRB 
review. Accordingly, this brief does not include a counter-recitation of the 
underlying facts. 
Summary of the Argument 
Because CSRB's decision was designated by clear administrative rule 
as a formal adjudication, jurisdiction over this appeal is properly before this 
Court. Further, Blauer should be estopped from arguing that the CSRB 
decision was an informal adjudication because the third district court ruled 
10 
against Blauer on this identical argument, and Blauer has acquiesced in the 
ruling by not appealing it. In any event, transfer of this case to the district 
court for a trial de novo is manifestly inappropriate because CSRB's 
jurisdictional conclusion was based on undisputed procedural facts. 
CSRB correctly dismissed the six remanded claims because Blauer had 
not timely appealed those claims through the statutory grievance process. 
One claim had been grieved to the Department director, but was not timely 
appealed to CSRB. Another claim was subsumed by Blauer's demotion 
grievance and had never been pursued as a grievance in its own right. The 
remaining claims were never grieved within the Department but were raised 
for the first time in a request for CSRB reconsideration. Because Blauer did 
not preserve his claims as required by statute, CSRB correctly determined 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims. 
Accordingly, the Department asks this Court to affirm CSRB's decision. 
Argument 
1. CSRB's decision was a formal adjudicative proceeding and 
jurisdiction is properly here. 
In its May 7, 2007 order this Court declined to transfer this case to the 
district court for a trial de novo. See Order of May 7, 2007, included as 
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Addendum B. In that order, this Court rejected Blauer's argument that this 
Court lacks jurisdiction over CSRB's adjudication. Further, this Court denied 
the motion outright, without reserving the issue for plenary consideration. 
Yet Blauer repeats arguments now in his opening brief, again asking this 
Court to transfer this case to the district court. To the extent that Blauer's 
argument is a repeat motion for transfer, it should be rejected again. 
Moreover, under principles of issue preclusion, Blauer should be 
estopped from continuing to argue that he is entitled to a trial de novo in 
district court. In a separate proceeding — commenced by Blauer for judicial 
review of the same CSRB decision Blauer seeks to have reviewed here - the 
third district court conclusively decided that it lacked jurisdiction to review 
CSRB's decision. See Addendum A (Order of April 9, 2007, Blauer v. Utah 
Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 070900108). 
The district court concluded that: (1) a "CSRB jurisdictional hearing is a 
formal adjudication"; (2) "Utah district courts are not granted jurisdiction 
over such appeals"; and (3) the district court did "not have jurisdiction to 
review the CSRB decision [of December 6, 2006]." Id. Blauer has acquiesced 
to this final determination by not appealing it. See Docket, Blauer v. Utah 
Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 070900108 
(showing that no notice of appeal was filed from the order of dismissal). 
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Issue preclusion4 prevents parties "from relitigating issues which were 
once adjudicated on the merits and have resulted in a final judgment." 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, f 27,110 R3d 
678. Issue preclusion has four elements: 
[1] [t]he party against whom claim preclusion is asserted 
must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior adjudication must 
be identical to the one presented in the instant action; [3] the 
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and 
fairly litigated; and [4] the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. 
Id. (quotingMurdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, f 15, 982 P.2d 
65 (bracketed material in original)). 
Although the district court's April 6th decision was a dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds, and therefore cannot be used as a dismissal on the 
merits of the underlying dispute, it nevertheless addressed the identical 
jurisdictional argument made by Blauer here, and should therefore have 
preclusive effect, at least over that jurisdictional issue. Although the 
Department could not find Utah authority on this point, other jurisdictions 
have concluded that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does preclude 
4The Department did not make this claim preclusion argument in its 
April 26, 2007 response to Blauer's motion to transfer appeal because that 
response was filed before Blauer's time to appeal the April 9, 2007 decision 
expired. 
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relitigation "of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdictional question." 
Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1211 
(10th Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 4436 (1981)). See also Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059,1063 (7th 
Cir. 1999) ("[A] jurisdictional dismissal precludes only the relitigation of the 
ground of that dismissal, and thus has collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) 
effect rather than the broader res judicata effect/') (citations omitted); GAF 
Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that 
judgment dismissing action for lack of jurisdiction will "have preclusive effect 
as to matters actually adjudicated" and will "preclude relitigation of the 
precise issue of jurisdiction that led to the initial dismissal"). Because this 
Court and the district court have already decided the very issue Blauer now 
renews, the Department respectfully asks this Court to reject the argument 
again. 
In any event, because CSRB's December 6, 2006 decision was 
designated by clear administrative rule as a formal adjudication, jurisdiction 
exclusively lies with this Court. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
"the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis 
added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (West 2004). Cf. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 63-46b-15(l)(a) (West 2004) (stating that the district court has 
"jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from 
informal adjudicative proceedings"). 
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),5 CSRB 
has designated by administrative rule6 that a "jurisdictional hearing is a 
formal adjudication" and an "administrative review of the file is an informal 
adjudication." Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-17. To determine whether CSRB 
has jurisdiction over an employment grievance, its administrator has 
discretion to either "hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may 
present oral arguments, written arguments, or both" or "conduct an 
administrative review of the file." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(b) (stating 
that the administrator "may" hold one or the other).7 Because CSRB can 
5UAPA consists of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 through -23 (West 
2004), inclusive. 
6CSRB "may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings 
to be conducted informally," providing certain conditions are met. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-4(l) (West 2004). But "all agency adjudicative proceedings not 
specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules shall be 
conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this chapter." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(2) (West 2004). Further, CSRB may only convert a 
formal proceeding into an informal one, or vice versa, provided the conversion 
is "in the public interest" and "does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any 
party." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (West 2004). 
7A grievant is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim only if he 
demonstrates CSRB has jurisdiction over his grievance. See Lopez v. CSRB, 
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choose between a jurisdictional hearing - a formal proceeding - and an 
administrative review of the file - an informal proceeding - it can, with that 
decision, also choose whether judicial review lies with this Court or the 
district court. And because CSRB chose to conduct a jurisdictional hearing, 
that decision necessarily dictated that any appeal would be before this Court. 
The remand order did not limit CSRB's statutory discretion to select a 
formal or informal proceeding to assess its jurisdiction. That order simply 
"remanded to the CSRB for consideration? without specifying the type of 
proceeding required. R. 583 (emphasis added). Only if CSRB had considered 
the remanded issues in another informal proceeding - another administrative 
review of the file - would the district court have had jurisdiction to review the 
decision in a subsequent petition for judicial review. But since CSRB opted to 
hold a formal proceeding, jurisdiction over Blauer's petition for review falls 
squarely with this Court. 
Furthermore, Blauer grossly misrepresents the recent CSRB 
proceedings when he asserts that he received no more of a formal 
adjudication on remand than he did initially when he raised the new issues in 
834 P.2d 568, 573 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[i]f an employee's 
grievance meets the statutory requirements in subsection 403(2)(a), the* 
employee is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim"). 
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his request for reconsideration. The most significant difference is that CSRB 
actually considered the new claims on remand, but did not even consider 
them in 2003 because it deemed the claims as ancillary to the demotion 
grievance. CSRB stated in its December 22, 2003 decision denying Blauer's 
request for reconsideration: "I recognize that Grievant's Request for 
Reconsideration addressed other issues primarily, but not entirely, stemming 
from the argument that a demotion occurred. Based upon my decision herein, 
however, it is unnecessary to address these arguments as I view them as 
essentially ancillary to the issue demotion." R. 278. On remand, however, 
CSRB analyzed each of the new issues individually. R. 666-71. CSRB's 
decision was based on a review of its own record, as well as the briefs and 
documentary evidence submitted to it, and made after both parties presented 
oral argument. R. 659. Accordingly, this Court should disregard Blauer's 
misrepresentations that the jurisdictional hearing on remand was no 
different than the previous administrative review of the file. 
Section 8 of UAPA provides that, in a formal proceeding, CSRB "shall 
afford all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct 
cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 
(West 2004). Despite this language, it does not follow that a full-blown 
evidentiary hearing is a necessary component of every formal proceeding, 
17 
especially when CSRB resolves a case based on legal conclusions drawn 
entirely from the pleadings, procedural history of the case, and documentary 
evidence submitted to it. CSRB did not need to resolve any factual disputes to 
assess jurisdiction and none need to be resolved before this Court can review 
CSRB's legal conclusions. Blauer did not submit, nor was he precluded from 
submitting, any documentary evidence that conflicted with the 
documentation CSRB relied on to assess its jurisdiction. 
As set forth in CSRB's detailed December 6 decision, the jurisdictional 
inquiry did not require the resolution of any factual disputes. The 
Department's jurisdictional motion to dismiss raised no factual issues 
requiring an evidentiary hearing. Based on the pleadings in the record and 
the documentary evidence submitted to it, CSRB analyzed each of the 
arguments Blauer made in his 2003 request for reconsideration. As set forth 
below, CSRB correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear those 
arguments. CSRB made legal conclusions, not findings of fact based on 
conflicting evidence. This Court does not need a trial de novo to examine the 
same record and documentary evidence CSRB reviewed to decide whether the 
lack of an evidentiary hearing warrants a remand to CSRB. 
As this Court has previously stated, "[n]o purpose would be served by a 
trial de novo in the district court where the relevant facts are not in dispute 
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and the issue is solely one of law." Hales v. Indus. Comm'n, 854 P.2d 537, 539 
n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Blauer fails to identify what evidence he could have 
presented that would have had any bearing on CSRB's review of the 
procedural history of the case. He fails to show that he was precluded from 
submitting documentary evidence to rebut the Department's evidence or to 
rebut anything already in the CSRB record. He does not explain why his 
failure to submit any conflicting documentary evidence to CSRB is not a 
waiver of his right to do so. And he fails to show what evidence at an 
evidentiary hearing would have altered CSRB's legal conclusions. Instead, he 
mistakenly implies that all of the events listed in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8, 
including an evidentiary hearing, must occur in every formal proceeding, even 
when unnecessary to the resolution of the case. Any purported factual 
disputes regarding the merits of his claims were not material to the 
jurisdictional analysis because an employee is only entitled to a hearing on 
the merits of a grievance once he establishes that CSRB has jurisdiction. See 
Lopez, 834 P.2d at 573 n.4. 
Even assuming that CSRB erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing, 
it does not follow that a missing evidentiary component in a CSRB proceeding 
transforms what was designated by rule as a formal proceeding into an 
informal proceeding. Any procedural deficiency in a formal proceeding is 
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simply that - a procedural deficiency. Blauer's authority does not suggest 
that a formal proceeding becomes informal whenever an agency commits an 
error in how it conducts that proceeding. This Court has never held that a 
violation of UAPA's Section 8 - containing the requirements for a formal 
proceeding - necessarily renders a proceeding informal. See Lopez, 834 P.2d 
at 571. Instead, this Court has stated only that "[s]ince there was a hearing, 
and there is no showing of any violations of Section 8, we conclude this was a 
formal adjudicative proceeding that we may properly review/' Id. Likewise, 
UAPA's provisions for designating formal and informal proceedings do not 
suggest that a deficiency in a formal proceeding changes the status of the 
proceeding. Rather, UAPA provides that a proceeding changes from formal to 
informal status by CSRB's designation only, either by rule or by express 
conversion. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (West 2004). 
Moreover, transferring this case to the district court would impose a 
collateral, summary reversal of the district court's April 6th dismissal order. 
It would force the district court to review a CSRB decision it has already 
determined it lacks jurisdiction to review. This would further complicate the 
procedural dilemma Blauer has created with his duplicative filings. If, as 
Blauer argues, judicial review of the CSRB's decision is properly in the 
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district court, then he should have appealed the district court's April 6th 
dismissal order and sought to have that order reversed. 
At best, an error in how CSRB conducted a formal proceeding may 
justify a remand to CSRB with instructions to correct the deficiency, not 
require transfer of the appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. But 
Blauer does not argue that the matter should be remanded to CSRB for an 
evidentiary hearing. Nor does he point to any evidence excluded by CSRB 
material to its jurisdictional conclusion. Instead, he plunges into the merits of 
the newly raised issues, even though CSRB did not reach the merits of those 
issues. This appeal, however, is not about the merits of Blauer's belated 
claims. It concerns CSRB's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the 
merits of those claims, based on Blauer's failure to properly appeal them 
within the statutory grievance procedures. 
2. CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Blauer's 
belated claims. 
CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Blauer's new 
claims because those claims had not been timely appealed through the 
statutory grievance process. In his opening brief, Blauer extensively discusses 
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the merits of his claims but does not address his failure to preserve them for 
CSRB review. This constitutes a waiver of the issues, and this Court should 
affirm the CSRB on that basis alone. See Brown, 2000 UT 89 at f 23 (stating 
that failure to raise issue in opening brief generally constitutes waiver). 
In any event, CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over 
the six new claims in Blauer's request for reconsideration. CSRB's authority 
is set forth in the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act (GAPA). See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-101 to -408 (West 2004). GAPA limits CSRB's 
jurisdiction to certain types of employment decisions. Utah Code Ann. § 67-
19a-202(l) (West 2004). CSRB's jurisdiction is limited to resolve only those 
disputes "that have not been resolved at an earlier stage in the grievance 
procedure/' Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202 (West Supp. 2006). Other than as 
authorized by GAPA, CSRB "has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other 
personnel matters. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(b) (emphasis added). 
An aggrieved employee must initiate a grievance within 20 days of 
theevent being grieved or, with a showing excusable neglect,8 within one year: 
(5)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for 
8CSRB "shall determine the applicability of the excusable neglect 
standard on the basis of good cause/' Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-13(3). 
Blauer made no showing or mention of excusable neglect before the CSRB 
and likewise makes not mention of it in his opening brief. 
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excusable neglect established by rule, an employee may submit a 
grievance for review under this chapter only if the employee 
submits the grievance: 
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving 
rise to the grievance; or 
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee 
has knowledge of the event giving rise to the 
grievance. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection 5(a), an employee may not 
submit a grievance more than one year after the event giving rise 
to the grievance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Once a 
grievance is initiated, an employee must process the grievance up to his 
department head within certain time limits before appealing to the CSRB. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-402 (West Supp. 2004). Failure to meet the 
statutory time limits for processing a grievance results in both a waiver of the 
employee's right to grieve and of the right to judicial review. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-401(4)(a)9 ("Unless the employee meets the requirements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails to process the 
grievance to the next step within the time limits established in this part, he 
has waived his right to process the grievance or obtain judicial review of the 
9See also Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(b) (West 2004) ("Unless the 
employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule, if 
the employee fails to process the grievance to the next step within the time 
limits established in this part, the grievance is considered to be settled based 
on the decision made at the last step/') 
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grievance.") 
As set forth below, CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction 
over the Blauer's six new claims. 
First, Blauer's claim regarding job performance parameters and 
performance plan was correctly dismissed because he did not timely appeal 
that claim to CSRB. That claim was made as part of Blauer's first grievance 
in July 2003. R. 643-44. Blauer received a favorable ruling on the 2003 
grievance from his department head (Level 4) and did not timely appeal the 
grievance further. An appeal from a Level 4 decision must be made to CSRB 
within ten days: "If the written grievance submitted to the employee's 
department head meets the subject matter requirements of Section 67-19a-
302 and if . . . the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, 
the employee may submit the grievance in writing to the administrator 
within ten working days." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(5) (West 2004). As 
CSRB correctly noted, Blauer admitted that he never appealed the Step 4 
decision on this first grievance. R. 643. Accordingly, CSRB lacked jurisdiction 
over the claim and properly dismissed it. 
Second, Blauer's claim that he was being assigned tasks outside his job 
description was correctly dismissed by CSRB because the claim was part of 
his demotion grievance. The demotion issue has now been considered by 
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CSRB, the district court, and this Court. All three tribunals determined that 
the reassignment was not a demotion. Specifically, this Court agreed that, "in 
reapportioning Blauer's job responsibilities from part-time to full-time 
adjudicator, [the Department] did nothing more than extend one of Blauer's 
core job functions, in response to varying department needs." Blauer v. Dep't 
of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 488, f 32, 128 P.3d 1204. Accordingly, the 
CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider further the 
issue. Even if this new claim were severable from the demotion claim, CSRB 
lacked jurisdiction to hear it because Blauer filed no antecedent grievance 
with the Department identifying the issue in its own right. 
Third, Blauer's claim of unlawful harassment and retaliation was 
properly dismissed by CSRB because Blauer filed no timely antecedent 
grievance with the Department. The claim was not brought in either of 
Blauer's prior grievances, but was made for the first time in the request for 
reconsideration. Moreover, because Blauer asserted that the claim arose out 
of his request for accommodation for a disability, he should have made the 
claim before the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor, which has 
exclusive jurisdiction to decide discrimination claims. See Buckner v. 
Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 852 (Utah 2004) (stating that "the exclusive remedy for 
an employee claiming a violation of the UADA [Utah Antidiscrimination Act] 
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is an appeal to the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor"); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-5-107U5) (West 2004) (stating that UADA is the "exclusive 
remedy under State law for employment discrimination"); Gottling v. P.R., 
Inc., 2002 UT 95, f 10, 61 R3d 989 (same). 
Fourth, Blauer's claim regarding personnel records was correctly 
dismissed because Blauer never filed a timely antecedent grievance with the 
Department. 
Fifth, Blauer's claim regarding administrative leave was correctly 
dismissed by CSRB because it was neither timely grieved to the Department's 
director no timely appealed to CSRB. 
And, sixth, Blauer's claim regarding written reprimands was also 
correctly dismissed by CSRB because Blauer never filed a timely antecedent 
grievance within the Department. 
Because Blauer failed to meet the statutory time limits for processing 
his antecedent grievance claims, he waived both his right to grieve and his 
right to judicial review, and CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Blauer's new claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-
401(4)(a) ("Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next 
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step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived his right to 
process the grievance or obtain judicial review of the grievance.") 
Conclusion 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is properly with this Court because the 
CSRB's decision was designated by clear administrative rule as a formal 
adjudication. Moreover, this Court has already denied Blauer's motion to 
transfer this case to the district court for a trial de novo. In addition, Blauer 
should be estopped from arguing that a trial de novo is a proper remedy 
because the third district court ruled against Blauer on this identical 
argument, and Blauer has acquiesced in the ruling by not appealing it. 
CSRB correctly dismissed the six remanded claims because Blauer did 
not timely appeal those claims through the statutory grievance process. 
Accordingly, the Department asks this Court to affirm CSRB's decision. 
Dated this Q_t^3ky of August, 2007. 
r. CLIFFORD PETERSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Department of Workforce Services 
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ADDENDUM A 
April 9, 2007 Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Blauer v. 
Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third Judicial District Court, No. 070900108. 
PHILIP S. LOTT (5750) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
LORINBLAUER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, an agency and instrumentality of the 
State of Utah; and the CAREER SERVICE 
REVIEW BOARD OF UTAH, an agency of the 
State of Utah of the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 070900108 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for hearing on March 26, 2007, of Defendants' 
separate Motions to Dismiss; Plaintiff appearing by and through his counsel, Vincent C. Rampton; 
Defendant Utah Department of Workforce Services (DWS) appearing by and through its counsel, 
Philip S. Lott; and Defendant Career Service Review Board (CSRB) appearing by and through its 
counsel, Steven K. Walkenhorst; the Court having reviewed the pleadings, received oral arguments from 
counsel, and being otherwise fully advised, FINDS: 
1. The Complaint herein alleges that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over a CSRB Decision 
which dismissed Plaintiff Blauer's employment grievance against Defendant DWS related to alleged 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Jud-;- i=»l District 
APR 0 9,2007 
violations of personnel rules. Complaint at KH 4, 5. 
2. The Complaint seeks trial de novo by this Court of Plaintiff Blauer's employment grievance 
and declaratory judgment regarding the nature of the CSRB Decision. Complaint at 14-15. 
3. The CSRB is the final administrative body to review grievances from Utah career service 
employees of, among others, alleged violations of personnel rules. U.C.A. § 67-19a-202. 
4. When an employee files a grievance with the CSRB, the CSRB is required to determine, 
among others, whether or not it has jurisdiction over the grievance and whether or not the employee has 
been directly harmed. U.C.A. § 67-19a-403(2)(a). 
5. On October 24,2006, the CSRB held a hearing to consider whether it had jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff Blauer's employment grievance. 
6. The October 24, 2006 CSRB hearing was a jurisdictional hearing at which the parties, 
Plaintiff Blauer and Defendant DWS, appeared and presented written and oral arguments. 
7. A CSRB jurisdictional hearing is a formal adjudication. Utah Administrative Code R137-1-
17. 
8. Following the October 24,2006 jurisdictional hearing the CSRB issued its Decision on 
Agency's Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff Blauer's employment grievance. 
9. An aggrieved employee or the responding agency may appeal the CSRB's formal 
adjudicative jurisdictional hearing decision and final agency action to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-16; Utah Administrative Code R137-1-17. 
10. Utah district courts are not granted jurisdiction over such appeals. 
11. On December 29, 2006, before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff Blauer filed with the Utah Court 
2 
of Appeals a Petition for Review of Administrative Agency Decision, seeking judicial review of the 
CSRB Decision. Blauer v. Utah Department of Workforce Services and Utah Career Service Review 
Board, Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 20061177 (2006). 
12. This Court (the Third Judicial District Court) does not have jurisdiction to review the CSRB 
Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. 
13. The CSRB is not a proper party to an appeal of its own decision. Blauer v. Department of 
Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204,1210 (Utah App. 2005). 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED: 
1. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are granted and Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed in its 
entirety. #_ 
DATED this Yy day of April, 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Philip S. Lott 
Steven K. Walkenhorst 
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ADDENDUM B 
May 7, 2007 Order of the Utah Court of Appeals 
FILED 
UTAH APPFI LATE COMR 
MAY 0 7 2007 
T O 
Lorin Blauer, 
Petitioner, 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
ORDER 
Case No. 20061177-CA 
v. 
Utah Department of Workforce 
Services, an agency of the 
State of Utah, and Utah Career 
Service Review Board, 
Respondents. 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis. 
This matter is before the court on petitioner Lorin Blauer's 
motion to transfer his appeal. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied. 
, 2007. Dated this 7 day of lYl^Lj 
FOR THE COURT: 
Judixh M. Billings, Judge/X 
ADDENDUM C 
Determinative Statutes and Rules 
§ 63-46b-3 
Note 4 
mal contract with his agency yet never notified 
the Department of his absence as required by 
the licensure statute; in short, the default result-
ed from the agent's failure to exercise due dili-
gence, not from excusable neglect. U.CA.1953, 
31A-23-312(1), 63-46b-3(2)(b)(i), 
63-46b-ll(3)(a)r Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b)(1). 
Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dept., 1999, 
991 P.2d 607, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 1999 UT 
App 330. Insurance <§=> 1620 
5. Decertification proceedings 
Victim of wildlife conservation officer's acts 
was not entitled to initiate decertification pro-
ceedings before division of police officer stan-
dards and training (POST). -U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-3(3)(a). Nielson v. Division of Peace 
Officer Standards and Training, (POST), Dept. 
of Public Safety, 1993, 851 P.2d 1201. Admin-
istrative Law And Procedure <3=» 450.1; Game 
<S=>6 
6. Applicable law 
Reference to "applicable law" found in stat-
ute permitting persons other than agency to 
initiate adjudicative proceedings if law applica-
ble to agency so permits is to agency's enabling 
statute, not rules. U.CA.1953, 63-46b-3(3)(a). 
Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Standards 
and Training, (POST), Dept. of Public Safety, 
1993, 851 P.2d 1201. 
Procedure <£=> 450.1 
STATE AFFAIRS 
Administrative Law And 
7. Dismissal 
Provision of Administrative Procedures
 f Act 
pursuant to which presiding officer may notify 
party requesting agency action that further pro-
ceedings are required to determine agency's re-
sponse to request authorized Industrial Com-
mission to dismiss workers' compensation 
claims without prejudice, particularly where ba^ 
sis for dismissals was failure to diligently pros^ Q-, 
cute claims. U.CA.1953, 63-46b-3(3)(d)t(iii). 
Doubletree, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 
1990, 797 P.2d 464. Administrative Law And 
Procedure ^ 467; Workers' Compensation &=> 
1174 
8. Appeal 
Driver's failure to object at beginning of hear-
ing on suspension of his license to the failure of 
the Division of Drivers License Services to in-
clude in its notice of hearing advice as to wheth-
er the license revocation hearing was formal or 
informal, after he was clearly informed that the 
proceeding would be conducted informally, pre-
cluded driver from claiming error on this 
ground on appeal. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-3(2)(a)(v). Brinkerhoff v. Schwendi-
man, 1-990, 790 P.2d 587. Administrative Law 
And Procedure @=> 669.1; Automobiles <§=> 
144.2(2.1) 
§ 6 3 - 4 6 b - 4 . Designation of adjudicative proceedings as informal—Stan-
dards—Undesignated proceedings formal 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings 
to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this chapter if: 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural 
requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter; 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the proceedings 
will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures; 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will be 
enhanced by categorizations; and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential 
benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
(2) Subject to ' the provisions of Subsection (3),.all agency adjudicative pro-
ceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's 
rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this 
chapter. 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal 
adjudicative" proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding if: 
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT § 63-46b~4 
Note 3 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of 
any party. 
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 260. 
Administrative Code References 
Administrative rules, adjudicative proceedings, see Utah Admin. Code 15-5. 
Administrative services, debt collection, Office of State Debt Collection administrative procedures, 
see Utah Admin. Code^21-2. 
Information technology services, Division of Informational Technology Services, adjudicative "pro* 
ceedmgs, see Utah Admin. Code 29-1. 
Library References 
Administrative Law^and Procedure <S=»446. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 15Ak446. 
C.J.S. Public Administrative |-aw and Proce-
dure § 116. 
Research References 
Jreatises and Practice Aids 
t£0 Federal Register 37002, Utah Regulatory 
Program and Utah Abandoned Mine Land 
Reclamation (AMLR) Plan 
Notes of Decisions 
Injgeneral 1 
Conversion to formal proceedings 
Judicial review 3 
1 In general 
Under Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(IJ-APA), each applicant has opportunity to have 
formal hearing before agency, or de novo re-
view by district court. l U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-0.5 
t0^ 63-46b-22, 63-46b-4(l). Cordova v. Black-
stock, 1993, 861 P.2d 449. Administrative Law 
And Procedure <§=> 469.1, Administrative Law 
£&d Procedure <®=> ,744.1 
M Conversion to formal proceedings 
; Broker dealer's challenge to state Division of 
Securities' converting proceedings against bro-
ker dealer from informal to formal failed to 
comply with rule requiring citations to authori-
$f \vhere only authority cited by broker dealer 
in""support of argument that Division acted im-
properly was statute that supported Division's 
action; thus, appeal of issue was disregarded. 
tt£JU953, 63-46b-4(3), 63-46b-6 to 
iS46b-iO; Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9). 
Jghnson-Bowles Co., Inc. v. Division of Securi-
ties of Dept. of Commerce of State of Utah, 
1992,~ 829 P.2d 101, certiorari denied 843 P.2d 
5,16. Securities Regulation <&=> 275 
3.- Judicial review 
dis t r i c t court was required to hold trial de 
novp to review Department of Public Safety's 
decision to suspend driver's license based on 
driver's arrest for driving under influence of 
intoxicating beverage (DUI), where Depart-
ment's decision was based on informal hearing 
presided over by hearing officer. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-0 5 to 63-46b-22, 63~46b-4(l). jCordo-
vav Blackstock, 1993, 861 P.2d 449. Adminis-
trative Law And Procedure <S=> 744 1, Automo-
biles '<&» 144.2(4) 
Administrative law judge's decision that 
workers' compensation claims were barred, and 
Industrial Commission's review thereof, consti-
tuted formal adjudicative proceedings which 
were properly reviewed by Court of Appeals. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-4, 63-46b-16 Hales v. In-
dustrial Com'n of Utah, 1993, 854 P.2d 537. 
Administrative Law And Procedure p=> 663; 
Workers' Compensation <S> 1858* 
Sale of parcel of public land by division of 
state lands and forestry was not a final order or 
decree from a formal adjudicative proceeding 
but, rather arose from informal adjudicative 
proceedings; therefore, Supreme Court lacked 
jurisdiction over petition challenging sale. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands and 
Forestry of State, 1992, 830 P.2d 233. States 
<3=>$9 
Supreme "Court has jurisdiction only over fi-
nal prders and decrees of agencies that origi-
nate in formal adjudicative proceedings U.C.A. 
1953, 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii). Southern Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance v Board of State Lands and For-
estry of State, 1992, 830 P.2d 233. Administra-
tive Law And Procedure <&=» 704 
505 
§67-19a-201 STATE OFFICERS & EMPLOYEES 
(6) Each year, the board shall choose a chair and vice chair from its own 
members. 
(7)(a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the transaction of 
business. 
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is present is action of 
the board. 
(8)(a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits for their services, 
but may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the performance of the 
member's official duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance 
under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their 
service. 
Laws 1989, c 191, § 7, Laws 1996, c 194, § 24, eff April 29, 1996, Laws 1996, c 243, 
§ 183, eff April 29, 1996 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Section 27 of Laws 1996, c 194, provides to sections in H B 403 and H B 406 that con-
"If this bill, H B 403 [Laws 1996, c 242], £<* with them If, however, any sections in 
c . _ D . , n _ , „ n , . _ i H B 403, State Boards, Commissions, Commit-
State Boards, Commissions Committees and
 t e e s > a n d C o u n c i J s A m e n d m e n t S ) o r H B 4 0 6 > 
Councils Amendments, and H B 406 [Laws
 S t a t e B o a r d s a n d Commissions-Benefits and 
1996, c 243], State Boards and Commissions—
 T e r m s r e p e a l s e c t ions amended by this bill, it is 
Benefits and Terms, all pass, it is the intent of the intent of the Legislature that the repealers in 
the Legislature that all of the amendments to H B 403 and H B 406 supersede any amend-
sections in this bill supersede the amendments ments made by this bill " 
Library References 
Officers and Public Employees <®=369 3 C J S Officers and Public Employees §§ 71 to 
Westlaw Key Number Search 283k69 3 72, 121, 130, 160 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids HRS Fair Employment Practices 325,900, 
Emp Discnm Coord Analysis of State Law Utah 
§ 49 88, State Personnel Management Act 
HRS Fair Employment Practices § 68 45, 
State Personnel Management Act 
§ 6 7 - 1 9 a - 2 0 2 . Powers—Jurisdiction 
(l)(a) The board shall serve as the final administrative body to review 
appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions about pro-
motions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, sala-
ry, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration 
of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of 
position that have not been resolved at an earlier stage in the grievance 
procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel 
matters. 
(2) The time limits established in this chapter supersede the procedural time 
limits established in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act 
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(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceed-
ing, any member of the board may: 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) certify official acts; 
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence; and 
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule. 
Laws 1989, c 191, § 8, Laws 1991, c 101, § 3, Laws 1991, c 204, § 8 
Library References 
Officers and Public Employees <S=>69 3 
Westlaw Key Number Search 283k69 3 
C J S Officers and Public Employees \ 
72, 121, 130, 160 
71 to 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Emp Discrim Coord Analysis of State Law 
§ 49 88, State Personnel Management Act 
HRS Fair Employment Practices § 68 45, 
State Personnel Management Act 
HRS Fair Employment Practices 325,900, 
Utah 
Notes o£ Decisions 
In general 1 
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1. In general 
Career Service Review Board had subject 
matter jurisdiction to issue order to Department 
of Corrections, requiring that career service em-
ployee be restored to former rank and salary 
U C A 1 9 5 3 , 67-19a-202 Career Service Re-
view Bd v Utah Dept of Corrections, 1997, 
942 P 2d 933, 322 Utah Adv Rep 8 Officers 
And Public Employees <®=> 72 33(1) 
2. Suspensions 
For purposes of determining whether Career 
Service Review Board had jurisdiction of its 
gnevance, senior investigator with Utah State 
Industrial Commission was not given ' de facto 
suspension" when Commission required him to 
take unpaid leave of absence in order to attend 
law school, employee made conscious decision 
to attend law school after being formally noti 
fied that he would be required to take a leave of 
absence if he did so U C A 1 9 5 3 , 
67-19a-202(l) Lopez v Career Service Re-
view Bd , 1992, 834 P 2d 568, certiorari denied 
843 P 2d 1042 Officers And Public Employees 
<S=>72 22 
3. Job sharing 
For purposes of determining whether Career 
Service Review Board had jurisdiction to hear 
state employee's grievance, Utah State Industri-
al Commission's decision not to allow senior 
investigator to job share did not violate person-
nel rule, insofar as rule gave Commission full 
discretion as to whether job sharing would be 
allowed U C A 1953, 67-19a-202(l) Lopez v 
Career Service Review Bd , 1992, 834 P 2d 568, 
certiorari denied 843 P 2d 1042 Officers And 
Public Employees <£=> 72 22 
4. Presumptions and burden of proof 
State employee had burden of showing that 
his grievance fit mto statutorily designated cate-
gory in order to bring that gnevance before 
Career Service Review Board U C A 1 9 5 3 , 
67-19a-202(l) Lopez v Career Service Re-
view Bd , 1992, 834 P 2d 568, certiorari denied 
843 P 2d 1042 Officers And Public Employees 
€=>72 61 
§ 6 7 - 1 9 a - 2 0 3 . Rulemaking authority 
The board may make rules governing. 
(1) definitions of terms, phrases, and words used in the gnevance process 
established by this chapter, 
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for purposes of the waiver of 
time limits established by this chapter, 
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PART 4. PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED 
BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
§ 6 7 - 1 9 a - 4 0 1 . Time limits for submission of appeal by aggrieved employ-
ee—Voluntary termination of employment—Group grievances 
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part 3 and the restric-
tions contained in this part, a career service employee may have a grievance 
addressed by following the procedures specified in this part. 
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grievance is directed may 
agree in writing to waive or extend grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time limits 
specified for those grievance steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402. 
(3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be submitted to the 
administrator. 
(4)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next 
step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived his right to 
process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the grievance. 
(b) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next 
step within the time limits established in this part, the grievance is consid-
ered to be settled based on the decision made at the last step. 
(5)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, an employee may submit a grievance for review under this 
chapter only if the employee submits the grievance: 
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance; or 
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of the 
event giving rise to the grievance. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an employee may not submit a 
grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance. 
(6) A person who has voluntarily terminated his employment with the state 
may not submit a grievance after he has terminated his employment. 
(7)(a) When several employees allege the same grievance, they may submit a 
group grievance by following the procedures and requirements of this chapter. 
(b) In submitting a group grievance, each aggrieved employee shall sign 
the complaint. 
(c) The administrator and board may not treat a group grievance as a class 
action, but may select one aggrieved employee's grievance and address that 
grievance as a test case. 
Laws 1989, c. 191, § 14, Laws 1991, c. 101, § 6; Laws 1991, c. 204, § 11; Laws 1999, 
c 21, § 86, eff. May 3, 1999. 
Cross References 
Rules Civ Proc , Rule 23 
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Class actions, Standing as a class of one, equal protec-
Natural gas leases, class actions, opportu- tion, see Village of Willowbrook v. 
nity to "opt out", see Phillips Petro- Olech, U.S.I11.2000, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 
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Notes of Decisions 
Judicial review 1 Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over Act 
claim, where employee allowed his Career Ser-
1. Judicial review v i c e R e v i e w Board appeal to be dismissed for 
* Former employee of Department of Public f a i I u r e t 0 prosecute. U.C.A. 1953, 
Safety, who brought action seeking vindication 67-19a-401(4)(a). Hom v. Utah Dept. of Public 
of Personnel Management Act rights, failed to Safety, 1998, 962 P.2d 95, 347 Utah Adv. Rep. 
exhaust his administrative remedies, and thus, 50. Officers And Public Employees <$=> 72.41(2) 
§ 67—19a—402. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved employee 
(l)(a) A career service employee who believes he has a grievance shall 
attempt to resolve the grievance through discussion with his supervisor. 
(b) Within five days after the employee discusses the grievance with him, 
the employee's supervisor may issue a verbal decision on the grievance. 
(2)(a) If the grievance remains unanswered for five working days after its 
submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the supervisor's 
verbal decision, the employee may resubmit the grievance in writing to his 
immediate supervisor within five working days after the expiration of the 
period for response or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the employee's supervisor shall issue a written response to the 
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision. 
(c) Immediately after submitting the written grievance to his supervisor, 
the employee shall notify the administrator of the board that he has submit-
ted the written grievance. 
(3)(a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's supervisor re-
mains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the ag-
grieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may 
submit the grievance in writing to his agency or division director within ten 
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working days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the 
decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the employee's agency or division director shall issue a written 
response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the 
decision. 
(4)(a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's agency or division 
director remains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if 
the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee 
may submit the grievance in writing to his department head within ten working 
days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, 
whichever is first. 
(b) Within ten working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the department head shall issue a written response to the griev-
ance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision. 
(c) The decision of the department head is final in all matters except those 
matters that the board may review under the authority of Part 3. 
(5) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's department head 
meets the subject matter requirements of Section 67-19a-302 and if the 
grievance remains unanswered for ten working days after its submission, or if 
the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee 
may submit the grievance in writing to the administrator within ten working 
days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, 
whichever is first. 
Laws 1989, c. 191, § 15; Laws 1989, 2nd Sp Sess., c. 3, § 2; Laws 1991, c 204, § 12. 
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Notes of Decis ions 
Notice 1 vice Review Board (CSRB) in connection with 
review of disciplinary action Lunnen v Utah 
Dept of Transp , 1994, 886 P 2d 70, certiorari 
1. Notice denied 892 P 2d 13 Administrative Law And 
Agency, as well as employee, is entitled to Procedure <S^  513, Officers And Public Employ-
notice of issues to be raised before Career Ser- ees <£=> 72 28 
§ 6 7 - 1 9 a - 4 Q 3 . Appeal to administrator—Jurisdictional hearing 
(1) At any time after a career service employee submits a grievance to the 
administrator under the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator 
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R137-1-17. Jurisdictional Hearing. 
A jurisdictional hearing is a formal adjudication conducted according to Subsection 67-193- 403(2)(b)(i) with Section 63-
46b-8 of the UAPA incorporated by reference. An administrative review of the file is an informal adjudication according to 
Subsection 67-i9a-403(2)(b)(ii) with Section 63-46^4 of the UAPA incorporated by reference. 
(1) Procedural Issues. The administrator shall determine the following: timeliness, standing, direct harm, jurisdiction, and 
eligibility of the issues to be advanced, and any other procedural matters or jurisdictional controversies according to Sections 
67-193-403 and 67-193-404. 
(2) Determination. The administrator shall determine which types of grievances may be heard at the evidentiary/step 5 
level. Those types of grievances found to have been resolved at a lower level or those that do not qualify for advancement to the 
evidentiary/step 5 level are precluded from further consideration in any grievance submitted for CSRB consideration. 
(3) Preclusion. Those types of actions not listed in Subsections 67-i9a-202(i)(a) and 67-193-302(1) are precluded from 
advancement to the evidentiary/step 5 level. When the grievance is precluded from the evidentiary/step 5 level, the matter 
under dispute shall be deemed as final at the level of the department head/step 4 written reply according to Subsection 67-193-
302(2). 
(4) Reconsideration. A written request for reconsideration may be filed with the administrator. It must be filed within 20 
days from the date that 3 jurisdictions! hesring decision or 3n 3dministrative review of the file decision is issued with Section 
63-46b-i3 of the UAPA incorporated by reference. The written reconsideration request must contain specific reasons why a 
reconsideration is warranted with respect to the factusl findings 3nd legsl conclusions of the jurisdictionsl hearing decision or 
administrative review of the file decision. New or additional evidence may not be considered. 
(5) Judicial Review. 
(a) The aggrieved employee or the responding agency may appeal the administrator's formal adjudicative jurisdictionsl 
hearing decision and final agency action to the Utah Court of Appeals within 30 calendar days from the date of issuance 
according to Subsection 63-46b-i4(3)(a) and Section 63-46b-i6 of the UAPA which are incorporated by reference. 
(b) The aggrieved employee or the responding agency may appesl the administrator's informal 3djudic3tive decision 3iid 
final agency action of an administrative review of the file to the district court according to Sections 63-46^15 and 63-46^17 of 
the UAPA which are incorporated by reference. 
(6) Summary Judgment. The administrator may, pursuant to an administrative review of the procedural facts and 
circumstances of a grievance case, summarily dispose of a case on the ground that: 
(a) the matter is untimely; 
(b) the grievant has failed to appear at the properly scheduled date, time, and plsce pursusnt to written notice; 
(c) the grievsnt tecks standing; 
(d) the grievant has withdrawn or otherwise absndoned the grievance; 
(e) the grievant has not been directly harmed; 
(f) the issue grieved does not quslify to be advanced beyond step 4; or 
(g) the requested remedy or relief exceeds the scope of these grievance procedures. 
(7) Transcription and Transcript Fees. If a psrty appeals a jurisdictional hearing decision to the Utah Court of Appeals or 
to the district court, the appealing party is responsible for paying all transcription costs and any transcript fees. The CSRB does 
not particip3te in the psyment of these fees when sppeals are taken to the appellate or trial court. See Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Rule 11, and Section 63-46^16(3), regarding transcript costs from formal adjudications under the UAPA. 
